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Abstract
We study a pay-for-efficiency scheme that encourages hospitals to admit and discharge patients on the
same calendar day where clinically appropriate. Since 2010, hospitals in the English NHS receive a
higher price for patients treated as same-day discharge than for overnight stays, despite the former being
less costly. We analyse administrative data for patients treated for 191 conditions for which same-day
discharge is clinically appropriate — of which 32 are incentivised — during 2006-2014. Using interrupted
time series, differences-in-differences and synthetic control methods, we find that the policy generally had
a positive effect on planned conditions with a statistically significant effect in about a third of conditions.
The results are more mixed for emergency conditions. The median elasticity (across all 32 conditions) is
0.09 but above one for six conditions. Condition-specific design features explain some, but not all, of the
differential responses.
JEL: D22, I11
Keywords: Pay for Performance; Best Practice Tariff; day surgery; same-day discharge; policy evaluation
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1. Introduction
Many healthcare systems reimburse hospitals through prospective payment systems (PPS) in which the
price for a defined unit of activity, such as a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) in the US or a Healthcare
Resource Group (HRG) in England, is set in advance and is equal across hospitals (Paris et al. 2010).
Economic theory predicts that hospitals will expand activity in areas where price exceeds marginal costs
and minimise activity in areas where they stand to make a loss.1 This form of reimbursement should
encourage hospitals to engage in efficient care processes and cost reduction strategies to improve profit
margins (Shleifer 1985; Ellis and McGuire 1986; Ma 1994; Hodgkin and McGuire 1994).
One way to reduce costs is by reducing length of stay, this being an important cost driver. For some
patients it may be possible to reduce length of stay to zero, specifically those for whom care can be
provided safely2 within an ambulatory setting in which patients are admitted, treated and discharged
on the same day (‘same day discharge’ (SDD)). Not only may an SDD be less costly, it might be to the
patient’s benefit. The British Association of Day Surgery (BADS) has recommended SDD for nearly
180 types of planned surgery (BADS 2006) and the British Association for Ambulatory Emergency
Care (BAAEC) has identified a range of conditions that require urgent care but where a subsequent
overnight stay for observation is generally considered unnecessary (BAAEC 2014). Implementing these
recommendations makes financial sense in the English National Health Service (NHS): for patients
allocated to the same HRG, hospitals are paid the same amount for SDD treatment as for treating those
who have an overnight hospital stay, despite the cost of providing SDD care being substantially lower
(Street and Maynard 2007).3 This should give hospitals a financial incentive to treat patients on an SDD
basis whenever clinically appropriate.
Despite these recommendations and financial incentives, SDD rates are lower than is clinically recomm-
ended for a wide range of treatments (Department of Health 2010)(see also Figure 1). The reasons for
low rates may relate to reluctance by doctors or to features of the hospital that constrain the ability to
offer care on an SDD basis. One way to encourage doctors and hospitals to address these reasons is by
increasing the SDD price, and this has been the approach taken in England. A payment reform known as
the SDD Best Practice Tariff (BPT) involves paying a higher price for SDD than for care that involves an
overnight or longer stay in hospital and has been applied to 32 different conditions.4 The SDD payment
policy is unusual in that it pays more for the less costly treatment, making it distinct from the usual form
of PPS in which prices are set at average cost (Shleifer 1985).
We investigate whether hospitals responded to the SDD incentive scheme and, in so doing, we contribute
to two related strands of literature. First, we contribute to studies that focus on the effect of price
changes on treatment choices. These find that physicians are willing to change their care patterns
in response to financial incentives (see Chandra et al. (2011) for a recent review of this literature).
1 (Semi-)altruistic providers may be willing to treat patients for which marginal costs exceed price as long as the financial losses are
offset by sufficient patient benefit. The extent to which this is possible depends on the potential for cross-subsidisation within the
organisation, and whether they face a soft budget constraint (Brekke et al. 2015).
2 As early as 1985, the Royal College of Surgeons of England noted that “ [...]it should be clear to all concerned, the surgeon, the
nursing staff, and in particular the patient, that day-surgery is in no way inferior to conventional admission for those procedures for
which it is appropriate, indeed it is better.” (Royal College of Surgeons of England 1985)
3 For example, in 2013/14 the average cost of planned surgery carried out as a day case in the English NHS was
£698 compared to the average cost of £3,375 for overnight stays. (https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/blog/2015/07/
day-case-surgery-good-news-story-nhs)
4 Formally, planned and emergency SDD care is incentivised through two different BPTs. However, the design of both BPTs is
identical and we therefore refer to both as one BPT.
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For example, a growing body of literature has shown that obstetricians respond to changes in the
profitability of caesarean section compared to vaginal birth by amending their treatment thresholds
for the invasive surgical procedure (e.g. Gruber et al. 1999; Allin et al. 2015; Foo et al. 2017). For
planned hip replacement, Papanicolas and McGuire (2015) found that more generous reimbursement for
un-cemented relative to cemented implants in the English NHS led to greater provision of the former,
despite a clinical recommendation in favour of the latter. Finally, Farrar et al. (2009) evaluated the
introduction of PPS in England and found that it led to 0.4-0.8% more planned surgery being performed
as SDD as well as an overall reduction in length of stay.
Our work also contributes to a second strand of literature evaluating pay-for-performance (P4P) programm-
es. A review of 34 hospital sector P4P schemes in the US and other OECD countries finds the effects
to be generally modest in size, short lived and sometimes associated with unintended consequences
(Milstein and Schreyögg 2016). The authors argue that the effectiveness of a P4P scheme is associated
with the size of the incentive and that they are most appropriate for emergency care, where hospitals
have less opportunity to select patients. Most P4P schemes focus on incentivising quality, either through
rewarding health outcomes or process measures of quality. But the P4P policy we examine is distinct in
that it incentivises efficiency so may be better termed a pay-for-efficiency (P4E) programme.
We offer several novelties to the existing literature. First, we analyse an unusual payment policy in which
English hospitals are paid a bonus BPT for treating patients on an SDD basis. This policy explicitly and
intentionally overpays hospitals for the cheapest care pathway, the objective being to stimulate take-up
and improve efficiency. Our study extends a previous study by Allen et al. (2016) which evaluates the
short-term effects of this P4E policy for cholecystectomy patients in England. That study used a DiD
approach with a control group of all non-incentivised procedures recommended for SDD and found an
increase in SDD rates of 5.8 percentage points (pp) in the first 12 months following the policy introduction.
We extend that study in two ways. Firstly, instead of just one condition, we examine 32 conditions to
which a similar bonus policy applied. This allows us to assess the generalisability of the policy by, in
effect, conducting 32 separate experiments. Secondly, we examine longer-term effects, up to five years
after the introduction of the bonus payment policy, which allows us to examine temporal responses.
Second, a distinctive feature is that the SDD incentive scheme was high-powered. The size of the bonus
was economically significant, varying from 8% to 66% more than for an overnight hospital stay. This
price differential compounds the cost advantage, which varied from 23% to 71% lower for SDD than
for an overnight hospital stay in the pre-policy period. These incentives are much larger than those
associated with most other P4P schemes, which are often around 5% (Cashin et al. 2014). The analysis
can therefore shed light on whether limited responsiveness to P4P schemes as documented in literature
is simply due to the small size of the bonus.
Third, we apply and compare three different econometric strategies, namely interrupted time series (ITS)
analysis, difference-in-difference (DiD) methods, and synthetic control (SC) methods pioneered by Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). While DiD methods are commonly applied in health
policy evaluations, SC methods are a fairly recent addition to our analytical armoury but are receiving
increasing attention in the wider economic literature (e.g. Billmeier and Nannicini 2013; Bharadwaj et al.
2014; Green et al. 2014; Kreif et al. 2016; Acemoglu et al. 2017). Sometimes it is not possible to apply
DiD or SC methods because of the need to identify appropriate control groups. In this study, because we
examine the same type of policy applied to 32 different conditions, we have subsets of conditions to which
either all three or just a subset of the methods can be applied. Consequently we are able to compare
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results from different methods for subsets of conditions we analyse, according to which underpinning
methodological assumptions are satisfied for each condition. This serves as a robustness check for our
findings.
Our results can be summarised as follows: Reassuringly, we find similar results to Allen et al. (2016)
for cholecystectomy but, disappointingly from a policy perspective, it turns out that the bonus has
the largest effect for this condition and its impact cannot be generalised. The BPT policy led to a
statistically significant increase in SDD rates of 4-10pp for four out of 13 planned conditions. Results
for emergency conditions are more mixed with four positive and three negative statistically significant
effects. Furthermore, the magnitudes of effects for emergency conditions are generally smaller, ranging
from +6pp to -6pp where statistically significant. The median elasticity of SDD rates to price is 0.24 for
planned conditions and 0.01 for emergency conditions (overall median = 0.09). Elasticities are larger for
conditions with larger post-policy price differences between SDD and overnight care, and, for planned
conditions only, with bigger profit margins. We find no clear temporal pattern of policy response across
conditions, again making it difficult to draw general policy conclusions. Findings are broadly robust to the
use of different analytical approaches.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional background and the SDD pricing
policy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical methods. Section 5 describes the
results. Section 6 is devoted to discussion and concluding remarks.
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2. Institutional background and theoretical predictions
The English NHS is funded by general taxation and patients face no charges for hospital care. Residents
have to be registered with a general practitioner, who act as gatekeepers and can refer patients for
planned inpatient care to any licenced hospital in England. Patients can be admitted for emergency care
via a hospital’s Accident & Emergency department or by direct referral from their general practitioner.
Most hospitals are publicly owned, although a small number of private hospitals also provide care to NHS
patients. All NHS hospital doctors are salaried and do not share in hospitals’ profits or losses.
The NHS adopted a PPS for hospital reimbursement in 2003. Hospitals are paid a pre-determined tariff
for treating NHS-funded patients, differentiated by HRGs (the English equivalent of DRGs). Patients are
assigned to a HRG based on diagnoses, procedures and, in some cases, other characteristics such
as age (Department of Health 2002; Grašicˇ et al. 2015).5 Initially limited to a small number of planned
conditions, PPS has been extended progressively over time and now covers most hospital activity.
We start by describing the construction of prices in the pre-policy period prior to the introduction of the
SDD policy. We denote the pre-policy period with α = 0 and the post-policy period as α = 1. While
the SDD policy was introduced for different patient groups at different times, we analyse each group
individually.
The tariff for a HRG (g) in year (k) in the pre-policy period (P0,k,g) is proportional to the average cost of
care reported across all English NHS hospitals for patients (admitted as planned or emergency) who were
treated three years before, C¯k−3,g.6 More formally, C¯k−3,g = (
∑J
j=1(Ck−3,j,g×Nk−3,j,g)/
∑J
j=1Nk−3,j,g),
where j = 1, . . . , J denotes the hospital, Nk−3,j,g is the number of patients for a given hospital j, and
Ck−3,g is the average cost of patients in hospital j. Reimbursement is further adjusted to account
for inflation (I) and expected efficiency improvement (E) factors.7 Therefore, the pre-policy price
P0,k,g = C¯k−3,g × Ik × Ek, with Ik > 1 and Ek < 1.
For most planned treatment, patients admitted and discharged on the same day (SDD) attract the same
payment as overnight stays (ON ). Therefore, P0,k,g = PSDD0,k,g = P
ON
0,k,g if treatment is planned. However, a
short-stay adjustment is applied to patients admitted as an emergency and discharged on the same day.
The adjustment takes the form of a factor 0 < λ ≤ 1 which takes the value 1 if the national average length
of stay for the HRG is less or equal to two nights and increasingly smaller values as average length of
stay increases. The short-stay adjustment is aimed at reducing the incentive to admit less severe patients
for observation rather than intervention. Therefore, emergency care including at least one overnight stay
has a price constructed equivalently to planned care PON0,k,g = P0,k,g while P
SDD
0,k,g = λP0,k,g.
The BADS and BAAEC both produce directories listing 191 clinical conditions (i.e. specific diagnoses
or surgical treatments) that are deemed suitable for SDD and a recommended rate (RR) of SDD
that is considered safe and appropriate (BADS 2006; BAAEC 2014). The directories represent a
5 The policy was originally known as ‘Payment by Results’ and has since been renamed as ‘National Tariff Payment System’.
6 All NHS hospitals provide detailed reference cost information to the Department of Health on an annual basis. These data are
collated in the reference cost schedule and provide information on the average cost of production across hospitals, further broken
down by admission type.
7 The base price is further adjusted for hospital-specific factors such as local cost of capital and labour and specialist hospital
status. As the policy evaluated is national and applies equally to all hospitals, these hospital-specific adjustments do not affect the
incentives created.
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clinical consensus about the appropriate level of SDD. From 2010, the English Department of Health
has gradually introduced explicit financial incentives (SDD BPTs) for specific conditions from these
directories.8 These incentives apply to all providers of NHS-funded care. The selection and design of
SDDs was informed by discussions with clinical stakeholders and varies across clinical areas (Department
of Health 2007). New conditions to be incentivised are announced six months in advance of introduction.
The general criteria for potential selection are volume (>5,000 patients/year)9, the national SDD rate
being below the RR for this condition, and evidence of variation in the SDD rate across hospitals
(Department of Health 2010). Not all clinical conditions meeting these general criteria have an SDD
incentive but by April 2014, 13 planned and 19 emergency conditions were covered by SDD incentives
(Monitor and NHS England 2014).
A condition incentivised by an SDD BPT has two prices such that PSDD1,k,g > P
ON
1,k,g for both planned
and emergency care. For example, under this scheme in 2010, hospitals are paid approximately £329
(or 24%) more for a same day discharge than an overnight stay for planned cholecystectomy (gall
bladder removal)(Department of Health 2010). This structure is common to all 32 SDD BPTs. However,
the absolute and relative size of the differential varies considerably and range from 8% to 66% of the
overnight admission price. After their introduction bonuses were approximately stable over time.10 For
planned care, a higher price is only paid if the patient was scheduled to be treated as a day case in
advance of admission. Therefore, the price for a patient discharged on the same day but not admitted as
a day case is the same as an overnight stay.
Table 1 provides an overview of the incentivised SDD conditions, the financial year in which the incentive
was introduced11, the hospital reimbursement with and without the SDD incentive, the average cost of
care reported by NHS hospitals in the year prior to the policy, and in addition the SDD rate and the
number of patients eligible in the twelve months prior to announcement of the incentive for that group.
2.1. Hospital incentives
In this section we compare the financial incentives that hospitals faced before and after the policy. To
keep the presentation simple, we suppress the HRG notation g and year variability k therefore focusing
on changes before and after the policy. Moreover, we assume that (i) each hospital has a total volume of
patients treated (either as SDD or overnight) equal to N and this is constant over time, (ii) each hospital
has identical costs, therefore suppressing h, but average costs can vary over time before and after the
policy (for example as a result in the change in case-mix arising from a change in the proportion of
patient treated as overnight admission).
The aim of the SDD pricing policy was to increase the rate of SDD towards the recommended rate by
introducing a financial incentive for hospitals. We illustrate this incentive for planned day case surgery
first. The profit function, denoted with pi in the pre-policy and the post-policy period is given respectively
8 In some cases, additional exclusion criteria are applied to limit the scope of the SDD BPT to non-complex patients. In these cases,
the group of patients with incentivised tariffs attached is a subset of those given in relevant directories and recommended rates can
be considered a lower bound of what is clinically appropriate.
9 One noteworthy exception is ‘simple mastectomy’ which has been incentivised since 2011 despite an annual volume of about
4,000 patients.
10 The bonus as a percentage of base price changed by more than 5% from introduction to the financial year 2014/15 for six out of 32
SDD BPT conditions. This variation arises due to changes to the base price that reflects year-on-year variation in the reported cost
data used for price setting rather than because of purposeful policy refinement.
11 Financial years run from 1st April to 31st March of the following calendar year.
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by
pi0 = N
SDD
0 (P0 − CSDD0 ) + (N −NSDD0 )(P0 − CON0 ) (1)
pi1 = N
SDD
1 (P
SDD
1 − CSDD1 ) + (N −NSDD1 )(PON1 − CON1 ) (2)
The difference in profit before and after the policy is:
∆pi = pi1 − pi0 = (PSDD1 − PON1 )NSDD1 −N(P0 − PON1 )
+ (NSDD1 −NSDD0 )(CON0 − CSDD0 )
− [NSDD1 (CSDD1 − CSDD0 ) + (N −NSDD1 )(CON1 − CON0 )]
(3)
Under the assumptions outlined above, the first term is positive and gives the additional revenues for
every treatment which is provided as SDD. The second term is negative and is given by the reduction in
revenues due to a reduction in the overnight tariff. The third term is positive if the SDD price induces an
increase in the SDD rate, which are less costly (evaluated at pre-policy costs). The fourth and last term,
in square brackets, relates to changes in the average costs, which can be due to patient composition
or external factors, the sign being generally indeterminate. We could argue, for example, that patients
who are treated as SDD after the policy are at the margin more severe, so that this will translate into
an increase in the average cost of SDD and a reduction in the average cost of an overnight stay (see
Siciliani 2006; Hafsteinsdottir and Siciliani 2010, for more formal theoretical models). We assume that
the increase in average costs for SDD is relatively small, so that an increase in SDD rates leads to a
reduction in overall costs (i.e. the sum of the third and fourth term is positive).
The analysis highlights that the SDD pricing policy generates a financial incentive for hospitals, equal
to (PSDD1 − PON1 ) > PSDD0 − PON0 > 0, to increase planned day case treatments, but the overall effect
on profits also depends on the reduction in the base tariff. A similar analysis holds for emergency
care where the only difference is that pre-policy the tariff was higher for overnight treatments, i.e.
(PSDD1 − PON1 ) > PSDD0 − PON0 < 0.
Notice that, under the assumption that the cost of SDD is always lower than the cost with an overnight
stay for a given patient, hospitals already had an incentive in the pre-policy period to treat planned
patients up to the RR as SDD. But as shown below in Section 3, hospitals had very low planned SDD
rates in the pre-policy period, and always well below the recommended one. This could be due to the
motivations of the doctor providing treatment or the constraining features of the hospital in which the
doctor works.
As regards motivation, slow uptake of SDD may reflect poor dissemination about best practice. Doctors
may not be aware of or may doubt the evidence that SDD is as safe as traditional practice involving
overnight admission. They may also struggle to identify the patient population that is suitable for SDD,
particularly if it is not recommended for all patients, i.e. RR<100%. Greater uptake of SDD may also
require some re-training (e.g. in laparoscopic surgical techniques) that carries monetary and time costs
for doctors.
Moreover, the hospital in which the doctor works may be constrained in its ability to extend SDD to
more patients. While many SDD treatments can be performed in a normal hospital setting, making
SDD standard practice may require building new facilities or repurposing existing hospital units that are
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devoted to SDD care. If so, expanding the volume of SDDs may require a long-term capital investment.
Some English hospitals may not undertake this investment, particularly those that face greater borrowing
constraints that restrict their access to capital funds (Marini et al. 2008; Thompson and McKee 2011).
2.2. Welfare
We conclude this section by discussing welfare implications. We discuss welfare under two perspectives.
First, we define welfare as the difference in patient benefits minus provider costs. It has been argued that
an increase in SDD rate will not harm patients as long as it remains below the RR. Under this assumption,
the introduction of the SDD price incentive will have no effect on patient benefits if SDD rates increase,
so that the effect of welfare is driven by its effect on costs. As argued above, an increase in SDD will
reduce costs under minimal regularity conditions. We can therefore conclude that the SDD pricing policy
is welfare improving, and that the size of the welfare gain increases with the number of SDDs (up to the
RR).
Second, we take the purchaser perspective, and define welfare more narrowly as the difference between
patient benefit and the transfer to the provider. Since patient benefit does not differ between SDD and
ON, the effect of the SDD price on purchaser welfare is, as shown above, given by its effect on the
overall transfer, and equal to (PSDD1 − PSDD1 )NSDD1 −N(P0 − PON1 ). This suggests that the purchaser
is always better off when the SDD price is introduced as long as it sufficiently reduces the ON tariff to
compensate for the increase in the transfer to the provider due to the increase in SDD price.
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3. Data
We use data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) on all NHS-funded patients aged 19 or older
admitted to English hospitals between April 2006 and March 2015 for care which could be delivered
as SDD according to the BADS / BAAEC directories (157 planned and 34 emergency conditions).
HES is an admission-level dataset that contains detailed information on clinical and socio-demographic
characteristics, the admission pathway and its timings, and whether care was scheduled as SDD in
advance (planned admissions only). The outcome of interest is constructed as a binary variable that
takes the value of 1 if the patient is admitted and discharged on the same calendar day, and zero
otherwise.
Figure 1 shows the SDD rate and the RR for each of the 32 incentivised conditions in the year 2009, prior
to the start of the SDD pricing policy. Observed rates for planned conditions are highlighted in light grey,
and those for emergency conditions in dark grey. There is marked heterogeneity both in the observed
rate of SDD and the gap between SDD rate and RR, i.e. the potential for growth.
In our empirical analyses we control for potential changes in patient complexity over time that may explain
observed changes in SDD rates. We construct a set of risk-adjustment variables from the HES dataset
including age (coded as a categorical variable in 10-year bands with separate categories for 19-24 and
≥85), gender (male = 1), number of Elixhauser comorbidities (coded as 0, 1, 2-3, 4-6 and ≥7) (Elixhauser
et al. 1998) and whether the patient had any past emergency admissions within 365 days (yes = 1).
As a measure of socio-economic status, we use the income deprivation score of the English Indices of
Deprivation 2010 (McLennan et al. 2011) for the patients’ lower layer super output area of residence.
Hospitals are consulted on any changes to the payment system — including the introduction of new
BPTs — approximately six months prior to the change. This gives them time and opportunity to adapt to
the new policy before the actual implementation, which may bias observed pre-policy outcomes. We
therefore exclude data for all patients treated in the six months prior to the condition being incentivised.
Also, for some conditions eligibility criteria were refined over time to restrict the incentive to a more tightly
defined patient population. In these instances, we apply the criteria that were valid when the financial
incentive first applied to this condition to ensure consistency throughout the study period.
The overall sample includes 11,336,138 patients with incentivised conditions and 21,121,500 patients
with non-incentivised conditions. Descriptive statistics for case-mix variables by condition are available in
Table A1 in the Appendix.
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4. Methods
Our empirical analysis seeks to estimate the impact of the SDD pricing policy on the probability of a
patient being discharged on the same day as admission.12 Separate models are estimated for each of
the 32 incentivised conditions.
We follow the potential outcome framework developed by Rubin and commonly applied in the policy
evaluation literature (Rubin 1974; Abadie and Imbens 2006). For every patient, we define two potential
outcomes: Y 1it is the outcome that a patient i would realise in month t if the SDD incentive was in effect
(potential outcome under treatment) and Y 0it is the potential outcome that the same patient would realise
without the SDD incentive (potential outcome under control). For patients who received care for one
of the 32 incentivised conditions, their observed outcomes before the introduction of the SDD policy
(t < tBPT ) correspond to their potential outcome under control, where tBPT is defined as the month
when the SDD BPT was introduced. After the introduction of the SDD BPT, their observed outcomes
correspond to their potential outcomes under treatment. By contrast, for patients who received care
for non-incentivised conditions (used as control groups in Sections 4.2 and 4.3), observed outcomes
correspond to potential outcomes under control throughout the entire study period.
Policy interest is in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), i.e. the patients who were treated
as an SDD for incentivised conditions after the introduction of the policy, defined as E[Y 1it −Y 0it |t ≥ tBPT ].
While Y 1it is observed for these patients, the potential counterfactual outcome under control Y
0
it is
unobserved. We employ three different analytical approaches to estimate the expected counterfactual
outcome E[Y 0it ].
4.1. Interrupted time series analysis
Our first analytical approach employs interrupted time series (ITS) analysis. The identifying assumption
of the ITS design is that a linear pre-policy trend in the proportion of SDD would have continued
uninterrupted in the absence of the SDD BPT policy. Therefore, the trend in the observed values of Yit
for t < tBPT can be used to construct the counterfactual outcome Y 0it for t ≥ tBPT .
ITS analysis uses segmented regression techniques to test for structural breaks in the linear time trend
when the SDD policy is introduced. The ITS specification commonly used in empirical policy evaluations
allows for a single break, which may manifest as an immediate shift in the proportion of SDD and/or a
homogeneous change in its trend. We extend this base specification to allow for heterogeneous effects
in each of the k = 1, . . . ,K post-policy years following the introduction of the SDD policy and specify the
12 Our analysis focuses on the intensive margin. Hospitals may also respond to the financial incentive by increasing the volume of
incentivised activity. However, we do not observe faster annual growths in volume of activity after the introduction of the SDD BPT
(pre: 6.5% vs. post: 2.3%, p = 0.264). Furthermore, the growth in non-incentivised conditions over the 9 year period (mean =
13.3% per year) exceeds that of the incentivised conditions (mean = 5.4%). Appendix Table A2 shows annual volumes of activity
for the incentivised conditions.
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regression model as
Pr[Yijt = 1] = α0 + α1Mt +
K∑
k=1
[γkDk + δk(Dk ×Mt)] +
4∑
1
νsQs
+
J∑
j=1
θjHj + (Xi × Zt)′ξ
(4)
where Yijt is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if patient i = 1, . . . , I treated in hospital j = 1, . . . , J
in month t = 1, . . . , T was admitted and discharged on the same day and the value of 0 if the patient was
admitted and stayed at least one night in hospital. The variable Mt is a continuous measure of time in
months.
Dk are dummy variables which take the value of 1 in each of the k = 1, . . . ,K post-policy years and
zero otherwise. The coefficients γk and δk measure shifts and changes in trend in the proportion of
SDD in each of the post-SDD years, respectively. Our model thus allows for a delayed impact of the
SDD policy which may be because clinical processes take time to be reorganised. Alternatively, positive
policy effects may fade over time due to increasing marginal costs of further increasing the proportion of
patients treated on an SDD basis.
Qs is a vector of seasonal (quarter) dummies, e.g. to allow for winter effects. Hj is a vector of hospital
dummies, which capture unobserved time-invariant differences amongst hospitals (e.g. management
quality, local demand) in the propensity to discharge patients the same day.
The adoption of SDD practice is likely to differ according to patient characteristics, with more severely ill
patients less likely to be suitable for discharge on the same day that they receive treatment. Failure to
account for patient case-mix may lead to biased estimates of the policy parameters if there are case-mix
changes over time or if hospitals respond differently to the incentive for different patient groups. We
address this concern by interacting a vector of patient characteristics Xi with Zt = [Mt, (Dk ×Mt)]. As
a result, trends in SDD rates can vary with patient severity and, therefore, the policy parameters can also
vary across patient groups.
The ATT of the SDD BPT in year k for the baseline patient (when all elements of Xi equal zero), defined
as τk, is calculated at the mid-point of each year k and given by
τk = γk +
1
2
δk (5)
where γk denotes the level change in the SDD rate in the year k relative to the level implied by the
pre-policy trend and δk is the change in its average monthly growth rate in the same years (relative to the
counterfactual growth rate α1). We calculate separate estimates of τk for each patient group defined by
Xi and then average over the distribution of patients treated in each year k.
The key focus of this study is the ATT calculated over the entire post-policy period, which we define as τ¯ ,
and is given by
τ¯ =
1
N
K∑
k=1
τkNk (6)
where Nk is the number of patients in year k and N =
∑K
k=1Nk.
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All models are estimated as linear probability models with Huber-White robust standard errors of the
model coefficients. The corresponding standard errors of policy parameters of interest are calculated
using the delta method.
4.2. Difference-in-difference analysis
A key assumption of the ITS model is that the pre-policy trend is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual
Y 0it for the post-policy period. In other words, the trend in the proportion of SDD observed before the policy
change would have continued afterwards if the intervention had not come into effect. This assumption
may not hold if other concurrent events in the post-policy period affect the trend in SDD rates.
We relax this assumption by employing a difference-in-difference (DiD) strategy. We construct Y 0it based
on the observed outcomes of a control group that is not affected by the SDD policy but is subject to the
same external influences and would respond similarly to them. These requirements imply that both the
intervention and the control show parallel trends in the average Yit prior to the policy introduction. After
accounting for differences between intervention and control groups in levels of expected outcomes prior
to the policy introduction, any further difference in levels after the policy introduction can be interpreted
as average effects of the SDD policy.
We estimate the following specification
Pr[Yijt = 1] = β0 + β1BPTi +
K∑
k=1
[γkDk + µk(Dk ×BPTi)] +
4∑
1
[νsQs + ϕ(Qs ×BPTi)]
+
J∑
j=1
[θjHj + ωj(Hj ×BPTi)] + (Xi × Vi)′ξ
(7)
where BPTi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for patients in the intervention group and 0
for patients in the control group. All other variables are defined as in Section 4.1, except for Vi which is
a matrix composed of BPTi, Dk and Dk ∗ BPTi. This is analogous to (Xi × Zt) in the ITS analysis
and is, again, designed to capture changes in case-mix over time. We allow for hospital fixed effects to
vary between the intervention and the control group to account for any differences in a hospital’s relative
propensity to discharge patients with different clinical conditions on the same day.13
The effect of the SDD policy in year k for the baseline patient is now given by τk = µk and the calculation
of the policy parameters proceeds as outlined before.
We select a separate control group for each incentivised condition. We consider as potential control
groups all non-incentivised conditions from the clinical directories that follow the same admission pathway
(planned or emergency), have a RR±15% of the intervention group (see also Allen et al. 2016) and have
at least, on average, 100 admissions per calendar month over the pre-policy period. Furthermore, to meet
the assumptions of the DiD approach, we only consider control groups that show a similar trend in the
proportion of SDDs prior to the introduction of the pricing policy, defined as (αBPT1 )/(αControl1 ) = [0.9, 1.1]
13 For example, a hospital may be 5pp more likely than the average hospital to discharge patients in the intervention group on the
same day and 12pp more likely to do so for patients in the control group. In this case, forcing a common hospital fixed effect for
both groups would be inappropriate.
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with estimates of α1 obtained from separate ITS regressions. Where multiple control groups meet these
criteria, we use the control group with the most similar pre-policy level, i.e. min|αBPT0 − αControl0 |.
4.3. Synthetic control analysis
DiD models are commonly applied using a single control group. In our study, we consider 32 incentivised
conditions. For some of these there might be more than one potential control group that satisfies the
selection criteria. For other incentivised conditions we might find no controls. We therefore also apply
the synthetic control (SC) method. In short, the SC method allows evaluating the effect of a policy on a
single treated unit (e.g. a country, region or, as in our case, an incentivised condition) by employing an
algorithm to select a weighted combination of potential control units. Weights are chosen to minimise the
difference from the intervention unit in terms of observed outcomes and predictors of outcome in the
pre-policy period. Under a number of assumptions, including a linear relationship between the covariates
and the outcome variable and a sufficiently long pre-policy time period relative to the variance of the error
term, the post-policy outcomes of the SC group can be interpreted as the counterfactual outcome of the
intervention group. The difference between observed and counterfactual outcomes provides an estimate
of the ATT.
As regards our study, there are two advantages of the SC method over the DiD method. First, SC
considers all potential control conditions, thereby making best use of available data without the need to
select just one particular condition as the control group. Second, it does not require any single control
group to exhibit a parallel trend with the intervention group; rather, by construction, the control group
matches the intervention group in levels of pre-policy outcomes.
The SC method requires a panel data structure with the same units of observation being followed over
time. We therefore follow Abadie et al. (2010) and aggregate the patient level data to monthly proportions
of same-day discharge at the level of the intervention group, i.e. one observation per month for each
condition. We apply indirect standardisation to adjust for changes in case-mix over time. We estimate
the relationship between patient characteristics and the probability of SDD in the financial year 2006 and
then calculate an adjusted proportion of SDD for all months t
Ŷt =
∑Nt
i=1 Yit∑Nt
i=1 Ŷit
× Y¯t (8)
where Ŷit is the predicted probability of SDD for a patient in period t given the estimated relationship
Pr[Yi,2006] = α+X
′
i,2006θ + i (9)
which we estimate as a linear probability model. This process is conducted separately for each condition.
This approach assumes the relationship between patient characteristics and outcome is constant over
time. Any deviations in adjusted predicted outcome between the intervention group and the control group
can therefore be interpreted as improvements in the probability of SDD. Note that, as long as the same
case-mix model is used for all periods, the choice of base year is arbitrary. Also, as our primary concern
is changes over time, we do not include hospital fixed effects in predicting the proportion of SDD.
The pool of potential control units includes all non-incentivised conditions meeting the criteria of similar
RR, admission pathway and minimum number of observations set out in Section 4.2. We specify the SC
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algorithm to maximise similarity of the intervention and SC groups in terms of outcomes and average
pre-policy patient characteristics. We then test if this is a reasonable control group from which to draw
inferences by graphical assessment of how well the pre-policy outcomes of the intervention group are
predicted by the control group, but also by constructing explicit tests. First, as recommended by Abadie
et al. (2010), we assess goodness of fit in the pre-policy period by calculating the root mean square error
(RMSE) of the predictions of the SDD rates of the control group compared to the intervention group for
each pre-policy month. We reject the control group if the average RMSE exceeds 20% of the pre-policy
SDD rate; similar to the ±10% rule used for selection DiD groups based on pre-trend. Second, good
control groups should not consistently over- or under-predict the outcomes of the intervention group in the
pre-policy period. We therefore construct a test statistic based on the number of times the monthly trend
lines cross in the pre-policy period and reject control groups that cross less than 20% of the time. While
these cut-offs are somewhat arbitrary, this procedure in effect operationalises the graphical analysis of
the goodness of pre-treatment trajectories of the SC outcome.
The effect of the SDD BPT in year k is now given by
τk =
1
12
tBPT+12k∑
t=tBPT+12(k−1)
E[Ŷ 1t − Ŷ 0t ] (10)
The average ATT over the post-policy period is computed as outlined in section 4.1.
As an SC model has a single treatment unit for each point in time, it is not appropriate to construct
traditional standard errors. We therefore adopt the approach of placebo tests originally proposed by
Abadie et al. (2010). We estimate a set of SC models, as described above, but treating each potential
control unit as if it was the treated unit in turn. The original treatment unit is excluded from the set of
potential controls for each of these placebo tests. From this process we acquire as many placebo ATT
estimates as there are potential control units. We then apply the tests described above and drop any
placebo results that do not meet the criteria.
The τ¯Placebo estimates from placebo tests represent variation in these values due to random chance. We
therefore construct a p-value as the proportion of placebo tests with |τ¯Placebo| > |τ¯ |.14 We then convert
these p-values to standard errors by using a normal approximation.
All computations are performed using the user-written synth command in Stata 14.
14 For example, if of 20 placebo tests, 3 have larger ATTs than the treatment model, this indicates p=3/20=0.150.
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5. Results
We conduct ITS analysis for all 32 incentivised conditions. DiD and SC analyses are conducted for
18 of these conditions for which appropriate control groups are identified: 13 conditions are analysed
using both DID and SC, 3 using just DID and 2 using just SC. We therefore discuss the ITS results and
compare them with those supported by DID or SC analyses, where applicable. Time-series graphs of the
proportion of patients being admitted and discharged on the same day with superimposed trend lines are
presented in the online appendix.
5.1. Average effect over the post-policy period
Our main focus is on the average effect of the SDD BPT policy, represented by the parameter estimate
τ¯ (i.e. the ATT in the average year over the full post-policy period) for each of the 32 conditions.
Figures 2 and 3 present the estimated effects with 95% confidence intervals for incentivised planned and
emergency conditions, respectively.
The results for the planned conditions generally support a (weakly) positive effect for 11 of the 13
conditions, with a weakly negative effect for two conditions (#9-10). However, the ITS effect is statistically
significant for only four out of the 13 conditions (#1-4). The largest effects are for #1 cholecystectomy
and #3 sentinel node mapping (>10pp), but are smaller (<5pp) for #2 simple mastectomy and #4 female
incontinence management. The results from applying the DID and SC methods generally concur with
ITS, with three exceptions that show positive and statistically significant effects (#5,7,13) under DID but
not ITS (with >5pp for the latter two conditions).
The results for the emergency conditions in Figure 3 are more mixed, but tend to be of smaller magnitude
than for the planned conditions. Of the 19 emergency conditions, ITS analysis indicates a non-significant
effect for 12 conditions, while four have a significantly positive effect (#18-19,21,31) and three have a
significantly negative effect (#14,20,24). The size of the effect ranges from -6pp to +6pp. For the 8
(out of 19) conditions for which a DID control group can be identified, the results from DID analysis
generally concur with ITS, though now #15 acute headache appears significantly positive, #23 deep
vein thrombosis appears significantly negative and #14 epilepsy is non-significant. For the 3 (out of 19)
conditions for which a SC analysis is conducted, the effect is always very close to zero, including for
two conditions estimated to have a significantly positive effect (#21, 31) and one estimated to have a
significantly negative effect (#14) when applying alternative methods. The low number of SC analyses
that satisfy our quality criteria is due to the limited pool of potential controls.
Taken together, these results indicate that the SDD pricing policy had a positive effect on planned
conditions with a positive statistically significant effect for 4/13 conditions under ITS and 4/10 under DiD.
The results are rather mixed for emergency conditions, with positive effects for 4/19 under ITS and 1/6
under DiD and negative effects for 3/19 under ITS and 2/6 under DiD. There is no general pattern to
either the size of the mean effects or the relative widths of the confidence intervals when comparing the
ITS and DiD results. The SC results appear to be more pessimistic compared to the other two methods.
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(13) Tympanoplasty
(12) Septoplasty
(11) Tonsillectomy
(10) Fasciectomy
(9) Bunion operations
(8) Therapeutic shoulder arthroscopy
(7) Hernia repair
(6) Laser prostate resection
(5) Endoscopic prostate resection
(4) Female incontinence management
(3) Sentinel node mapping and resection
(2) Simple mastectomy
(1) Cholecystectomy
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Average treatment effect on the treated (τ̅ )
ITS DID SC
Figure 2: Average change in SDD rate over post-policy - planned conditions
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(32) Abdominal pain
(31) Anemia
(30) Bladder outflow obstruction
(29) Low risk pubic rami
(28) Minor head injury
(27) Arrhythmia
(26) Community acquired pneumonia
(25) Falls including syncope
(24) Deliberate self-harm
(23) Deep vein thrombosis
(22) Renal / ureteric stones
(21) Cellulitis
(20) Appendicular fractures
(19) Chest pain
(18) Pulmonary embolism
(17) Lower respiratory tract infections
(16) Asthma
(15) Acute headache
(14) Epileptic seizure
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Average treatment effect on the treated (τ̅ )
ITS DID SC
Figure 3: Average change in SDD rate over post-policy - emergency conditions
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The significant ITS results translate into approximately 6,500 more patients admitted, treated and
discharged on the same day in a year across all incentivised conditions15. As Figure 4 shows, these
overall effects are driven by large positive effects for cholecystectomy (#1), sentinel node mapping (#3)
and chest pain (#19), but these are offset by a large negative effect for self-harm (#24).
1748
146
3805
560
-1060
742
5007
-1098
1096
-5199
157
604
Cholecystectomy
Simple mastectomy
Sentinel node mapping
Operations to manage
female incontinence
Epileptic seizure
Pulmonary embolism
Chest pain
Appendicular fractures not requiring fixation
Cellulitis
Deliberate self-harm
Community acquired pneumonia
Anemia
-5000 0 5000
Number of additional patients
Figure 4: Additional SDD patients per year based on ITS estimates
15 The additional patients treated as SDD across all incentivised conditions in a given year is
∑32
c=1 τ¯Nc where Nc is the number of
patients within the scope of each incentivised condition c in the average post-policy year. Where the estimate for τ¯ is insignificant,
we assume the value of this parameter is zero. Where the estimated effect is significant, we use the point estimate.
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5.2. Time-varying effects
Our models allow for policy effects to vary over time and effects for each year after policy introduction are
reported for each type of analysis in Tables 2-4. Focussing on the ITS results, as these are available for
all 32 conditions, we find that 22 indicate at least one significant year effect. The patterns over time are
non-linear and almost every possible combination of year-on-year effects is observed. We find conditions
with initially positive and then strengthening effects (#1,3-4,18-19,21,31) or weakening effects (#7-8); and
conditions with initially negative effects which grow more pronounced (#10,14,24) or less pronounced
(#15-17,22-23,25,32). The results exhibit a similar variety of year-on-year patterns when we conduct DID
(Table 3) or SC analysis (Table 4). The results suggest that there is no common behavioural response to
the introduction of the SDD BPT over time.
5.3. Association with incentive design features
We now investigate if the response to policy is associated with features of the design of SDD incentives.
The 32 conditions incentivised by the policy vary in the size of the price differential PSDD1 − PON1 relative
to the base price PON1 . To compare the estimated ITS effect across conditions we, therefore, compute
the elasticities of the proportion of SDD with respect to price as
 =
τ¯ /Y¯Pre
(PSDD1 − PON1 )/PON1
(11)
where Y¯Pre is the observed outcome for the incentivised condition in the year before the announcement
period. The median elasticity across the 13 planned and 19 emergency conditions is 0.24 and 0.01,
respectively. Six conditions show an elasticity above 1.
Hospitals may respond more strongly for conditions offering relatively higher financial returns, keeping
other factors constant. Figures 5a and 5b plot the elasticities as a function of the post-policy SDD price
PSDD1 and as a function of the price difference PSDD1 − PON1 . Figure 5c shows the association between
the policy response and the total incentive, capturing both price and cost differences between SDD
and ON, the latter being approximated by information on average costs in the year prior to the policy
introduction. There is suggestive evidence that larger elasticities are concentrated in conditions with
higher SDD prices and larger price differences. Moreover, elasticities appear to increase in the size
of the total incentive ∆(P − AC) = (PSDD1 − ACSDD0 )− (PON1 − ACON0 ) and this association is more
pronounced across planned SDD conditions.
We also explore whether responses appear to be driven by clinical reasons. We hypothesise that
responses to the BPT are more pronounced if SDD pre-policy rates are lower and the gap to the RR
is higher, therefore giving more scope for improvement. Figure 5d provides some support that larger
elasticities occur for conditions with lower pre-policy SDD rates, but Figure 5e does not suggest a
relationship between the elasticities and the gap between existing practice (i.e. pre-policy SDD rate) and
the RR.
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Figure 5: Association between price elasticity of SDD care and tariff design factors
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6. Conclusions
We have assessed the long-term impact of a generous pricing policy designed to encourage hospitals
to treat patients as a ‘same day discharge’, involving admission, treatment and discharge on the same
calendar day. Despite being considered clinically appropriate and having lower costs, English policy
makers have been frustrated by the low rates of SDD for many conditions. Consequently, in order to
encourage behavioural change by doctors and hospitals, policy makers have set prices for SDD that are
well above costs and are also higher than the price for otherwise identical hospital care that involves
an overnight stay. This P4E policy is, therefore, unusual both in having different objectives to most P4P
schemes and also in offering high-powered incentives.
Economic theory predicts that a significant price differential would result in greater provision of treatment
on an SDD basis. An early study into the policy impact for one condition, cholecystectomy, suggested
that the SDD pricing policy met short-term policy objectives (Allen et al. 2016). This supported the
roll-out of the policy to 31 more conditions. Our study set out to assess how far the original findings
are generalisable and would also be observed for these other conditions, whether short-term impacts
would hold over the longer-term and what design features of the policy might explain the magnitude
of any response. Evaluating across all 32 conditions, we do find a positive response, translating into
approximately 6,500 more patients treated on an SDD basis per year. However, perhaps surprisingly, we
do not find a consistent positive response across all incentivised conditions. Indeed, for some conditions
the response is negative: despite the enhanced price advantage, fewer SDD treatments are provided
post-policy than predicted. For others there is no apparent response. Nor are we able to identify any
general temporal pattern in the policy response, with both rapid and delayed uptake of SDD practices
being observed. These mixed results mirror those of the literature on P4P, which provides inconclusive
evidence for the effectiveness of using financial incentives to drive quality (Milstein and Schreyögg 2016).
This lack of generalisability cautions against drawing firm conclusions from a single analysis. Indeed,
cholecystectomy turns out to be the condition exhibiting the greatest positive response among the 32
conditions. Moreover, while Milstein and Schreyögg (2016) suggested that P4P arrangements are most
appropriate for emergency care, where hospitals have less opportunity to select patients, we find that the
SDD pricing policy was more effective for planned care (median elasticity = 0.24) than emergency care
(median = 0.01). This may be because clinicians may have ethical concerns about discharging patients
in urgent need of care without a period of observation, whereas such concerns are less prominent when
care is scheduled in advance. Also, emergency admissions occur at unpredictable points in the day,
making it difficult to achieve SDD for some patients such as those admitted late in the evening. This may
limit the scope for rapid increases in SDD rates in emergency conditions compared to planned conditions
that permit efficient scheduling.
It has been argued that the limited impact of P4P schemes is due to incentives being too small and the
incentivised behaviour lacking clinical buy-in. In this study, for all conditions, the price incentive was
more high-powered than that typically associated with P4P schemes. But there was significant variation
across the conditions in terms of the relative size of the incentive, and we exploit this to investigate the
association of incentive size and the estimated clinical response across 32 conditions; in effect evaluating
32 separate experiments. There is suggestive evidence that the response to the incentive was greater for
conditions with higher SDD prices post policy and with lower SDD rates pre policy. There does not appear
to be an association between the size of the price differential, i.e. the marginal reimbursement that
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hospitals attract from adopting SDD care, and the size of the response but there is a positive association,
especially for planned conditions, when both price and cost advantages of SDD care are taken into
consideration.
In conclusion, we find some evidence that hospitals respond to price signals and that payers, therefore,
can use pricing instruments to improve supply-side efficiency. However, there appears to be substantial
variation in hospitals’ reactions even among similar types of financial incentives that is not explained
by the size of the financial incentive or the clinical setting in which it is applied. It has been said that
a randomised control trial demonstrates only that something works for one group of patients in one
particular context but may not be generalisable (Rothwell 2005). Similarly, a pricing policy that appears to
work as intended in one area may not be effective when applied elsewhere, hence the need for continued
experimentation and evaluation.
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7. Appendix
Table A1: Means of patient characteristics
# BPT Age Male
Deprivation
score
Elixhauser
score
Past emergency
admission
1 Cholecystectomy 49.9 0.22 0.16 0.97 0.43
2 Simple mastectomy 50.9 0.17 0.13 0.54 0.09
3 Sentinel node mapping 59.0 0.10 0.13 0.99 0.08
4 Operations to manage female incontinence 53.3 0.00 0.14 0.73 0.07
5 Endoscopic prostate resection 72.1 1.00 0.13 1.78 0.38
6 Laser prostate resection 71.4 1.00 0.13 1.56 0.37
7 Hernia repair 58.3 0.85 0.14 0.86 0.11
8 Shoulder decompression 56.1 0.50 0.14 0.95 0.07
9 Bunion operation 56.4 0.16 0.14 0.72 0.05
10 Fasciectomy 64.6 0.78 0.13 0.81 0.06
11 Tonsillectomy 32.0 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.17
12 Septoplasty 41.2 0.69 0.15 0.42 0.06
13 Tympanoplasty 42.4 0.50 0.16 0.15 0.06
14 Epilepsy 53.5 0.54 0.18 3.57 0.59
15 Acute headache 45.9 0.35 0.17 1.22 0.30
16 Asthma 47.1 0.30 0.19 2.55 0.40
17 Respiratory 51.7 0.44 0.17 0.70 0.26
18 Pulmonary embolism 62.3 0.47 0.14 3.03 0.36
19 Chest pain 59.3 0.53 0.17 2.22 0.37
20 Appendicular fractures 63.4 0.41 0.16 1.61 0.26
21 Cellulitis 57.0 0.56 0.16 1.66 0.31
22 Renal/ureteric stones 45.8 0.69 0.17 0.74 0.27
23 Deep vein thrombosis 61.8 0.50 0.16 2.03 0.43
24 Deliberate self-harm 39.1 0.43 0.20 2.19 0.44
25 Falls 67.6 0.52 0.16 2.46 0.37
26 Pneumonia 51.8 0.50 0.16 0.63 0.22
27 Fibrillation 68.1 0.48 0.14 3.42 0.39
28 Head injury 54.9 0.56 0.18 1.63 0.33
29 Pelvis fracture 81.3 0.15 0.14 2.43 0.37
30 Bladder outflow 68.5 0.81 0.15 2.15 0.39
31 Anemia 69.7 0.36 0.17 3.94 0.38
32 Abdominal pain 47.7 0.35 0.17 1.51 0.39
Notes: See Section 3 for variable definitions.
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